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Abstract—The growing popularity of mobile and wearable
devices with built–in cameras, the bright prospect of camera
related applications such as augmented reality and life–logging
system, the increased ease of taking and sharing photos, and
advances in computer vision techniques have greatly facilitated
people’s lives in many aspects, but have also inevitably raised
people’s concerns about visual privacy at the same time. Moti-
vated by recent user studies that people’s privacy concerns are
dependent on the context, in this paper, we propose Cardea, a
context–aware and interactive visual privacy protection frame-
work that enforces privacy protection according to people’s
privacy preferences. The framework provides people with fine–
grained visual privacy protection using: i) personal privacy
profiles, with which people can define their context–dependent
privacy preferences; and ii) visual indicators: face features, for
devices to automatically locate individuals who request privacy
protection; and iii) hand gestures, for people to flexibly interact
with cameras to temporarily change their privacy preferences.
We design and implement the framework consisting of the client
app on Android devices and the cloud server. Our evaluation
results confirm this framework is practical and effective with
86% overall accuracy, showing promising future for context–
aware visual privacy protection from pervasive cameras.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, built–in cameras have been serving as indispens-
able components of mobile and wearable devices. Cameras
with smaller size and higher resolution support a number
of services and applications such as taking photos, mobile
augmented reality, and life–logging systems on devices like
smartphones, Microsoft HoloLens [1], Google Glass [2], and
Narrative Clip [3]. The trend of embedding cameras in wear-
ables will keep growing, an example of which is smart contact
lens1.
However, the ubiquitous presence of cameras, the ease of
taking photos and recording video, along with “always on” and
“non–overt act” features threaten individuals’ rights to have
private or anonymous social lives, raising people’s concerns of
visual privacy. More specifically, photos and videos captured
without getting permissions from bystanders, and then up-
loaded to social networking sites, can be accessed by everyone
online, potentially leading to invasion of privacy. Malicious
applications on the device may also inadvertently leak captured
media data2. What makes it worse is that recognition technolo-
1http://money.cnn.com/2016/05/12/technology/
eyeball-camera-contact-sony/
2http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/
popular-android-camera-app-leaks/
gies can link images to specific people, places, and things, thus
reveal far more information than expected, making searchable
what was not previously considered searchable [4], [5]. All
these possible consequences, whether have been realized by
people or not, may hinder their acceptance of advanced wear-
able consumer products. A representative example is Google
Glass, which has been questioned by US Congressional Bi-
Partisan Privacy Caucus and Data Protection Commissioners
around the world concerning privacy risks to the public [6],
[7]. They have huge concerns regarding the privacy of non–
users/bystanders, and have raised questions of “How does
Google plan to to prevent Google Glass from unintentionally
collecting data about non–users without consent?” and “Are
product lifecycle guidelines and frameworks, such as Privacy
by Design, being implemented in connection with its design
and commercialization?” From these legal concerns, we are
confident that in the future wearable devices with cameras
are supposed to implement Privacy by Design before being
released to the global markets. Therefore, we base our research
on this assumption and aim to develop the technology that can
enable such requirement.
In reality, both legal and technical measurements have been
proposed to address privacy issues raised by unauthorized or
unnoticed visual information collection. For instance, Google
Glass is banned at places such as banks, hospitals, and bars3.
However, prohibiting camera usage does not resolve the issue
fundamentally, but instead sacrifices people’s rights to capture
happy moments even if there is no bystander in the back-
ground. As a result, there are growing needs to design techni-
cal solutions to protect individuals’ visual privacy in a world
where cameras are becoming pervasive. Some recent attempts
are using visual markers such as QR code [8], [9] or colorful
hints like hats [10] for individuals to actively express their
unwillingness to be captured. However, these visual markers
suffer from similar limitations. First, people are less likely
to wear a QR code, despite the technical feasibility of these
approaches. Moreover, privacy concerns vary widely among
individuals, and people’s privacy preferences change from time
to time, following patterns which cannot be conveyed by static
visual markers. In fact, what individuals are doing, with whom,
and where at, are all factors which determine whether people
3https://www.searchenginejournal.com/top-10-places-that-have-banned-google-glass/
66585/
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think their privacy should be protected. Therefore, we are
looking for a natural, flexible, and fine-grained mechanism
for people to express, modify, and control their individualized
privacy preferences.
In this paper, we propose a visual privacy protection frame-
work for individuals using: i) personalized privacy profiles,
that people can define their context–dependent privacy prefer-
ences with a set of privacy related factors including location,
scene, and other’s presence; ii) face features, for devices to
locate individuals who request privacy control; and iii) hand
gestures, which help people interact with cameras to temporar-
ily change their privacy preferences. By using this framework,
the device will automatically compute context factors, compare
them with people’s privacy profiles, and finally enforce privacy
protection conforming to people’s privacy preferences.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section II
we introduce motivation and challenges of practical visual
privacy protection; in Section III we provide a high–level
overview of our framework; in Section IV we describe detailed
design and implementation of the system; in Section V we
present the evaluation results; in Section VI we discuss the
related work; and finally, in Section VII we conclude the paper
and discuss plans for future work.
II. PRACTICAL VISUAL PRIVACY PROTECTION
The goal of our work is to propose an in situ privacy
protection approach conforming with the principle of Privacy
by Design. Devices with recording capability can protect
bystanders’ visual privacy automatically and immediately ac-
cording to their privacy preferences. Our work is motivated by
the findings from recent user studies, and encounters several
challenges that help shape up the final design.
A. Context–dependent Personal Privacy Preferences
Recently, some works try to understand people’s attitudes
towards visual privacy concerns raised by pervasive cameras
and rapid development of wearable technologies. Hoyle et al.
[11], [12] find that life–loggers are concerned about the privacy
of bystanders, and a combination of factors including time,
location, and objects in the photo determines the sensitivity
of the photo. A user study conducted by Denning et al. [13]
also shows that participants’ acceptability of being recorded
by Augmented Reality Glasses are dependent on a number of
elements, including the place and what they are doing when the
recording is taken. Based on the above findings, we conclude
the following points that motivate our work:
• People’s privacy concerns are dependent on context. Al-
though location is an important factor of privacy con-
cerns, what individuals are doing and with whom are
more essential and crucial factors that directly relate to
privacy.
• People’s privacy preferences vary from each other, thus
individuals should be able to express their own personal
privacy preferences.
• People’s privacy preferences may change from time to
time, therefore individuals need a way to change such
preferences easily.
• Generally the public hold positive attitudes towards en-
forcing privacy protection on images to respect others’
privacy preferences.
B. Challenges, Principles, and Limitations
According to people’s context–dependent privacy concerns
and conclusions, a practical visual privacy protection frame-
work is faced with the following challenges:
The first challenge is what elements should be taken into
consideration regarding context. A practical protection ap-
proach should seek a balance between granularity and rep-
resentativity of context, at the same time taking computa-
tional complexity into consideration. In our current design,
we choose location, scene, and presence of other people as
elements to define context. Location gives an approximate area
scope that requests privacy protection. Scene describes places,
and usually indicates what individuals are doing. Presence of
other people can be a concern when individuals want to keep
their social relationships private.
The second challenge is how to inform cameras of by-
standers’ privacy preferences. Compared with external marker,
individuals’ faces are more natural and effective visual cues.
To this end, people need to provide their face features for
individual recognition, and then set their personal privacy
profiles by selecting context elements they are concerned with.
The third challenge is how people can easily modify their
privacy preferences. Moreover, bystanders should be able to
react to cameras immediately when they find being captured
without efforts on updating profiles. Therefore, we offer hand
gestures for individuals to “speak out” their privacy prefences
in the capturing moment. Once a certain gesture is detected,
the image will be processed to retain or remove individual’s
identifiable information accordingly.
The technical focus of our approach is on proving the
feasibility of a context–aware and interactive visual privacy
protection framework through system design, implementation,
and evaluation. However, like other technical solutions [14],
[10], [15], [9], [16], our approach only works with compliant
devices and users. Any non–compliant device can still capture
images without respecting people’s privacy preferences. Also,
we assume the cloud server that stores user profiles is trusted.
Though there are limitations of our approach, we hope our
work can motivate more complete visual privacy protection
approaches, and finally be integrated into default camera
subsystems.
III. CARDEA OVERVIEW
In this section, we first introduce some key concepts. Then
we discuss major components of Cardea.
A. Key Concepts
Bystander, Recorder, User, and Cloud: A bystander is
the person who may be captured by pervasive cameras. A
Fig. 1. Cardea overview. The client application allows bystanders to register
and set privacy profile. Users can use the platform to take pictures while
respecting others privacy preferences. The cloud server recognizes users,
retrieves privacy profiles, and performs necessary computations.
recorder is the person who holds a device with a built–in
camera. A bystander who worries about his visual privacy
can use Cardea to express his privacy preferences. A recorder
who respects bystanders’ privacy preferences uses Cardea
framework to capture images. Both the bystander and recorder
become users of the privacy protection framework. The cloud
listens to recorder’s requests and makes sure captured images
are compliant with registered bystander’s privacy preferences.
Privacy Profile: Privacy profiles contain context elements,
whether enabling hand gestures or not, and the protection
action.
a) Context Elements: Context elements are factors that
reflect people’s visual privacy concerns. Currently, we have
considered location, scene, and people in the image. More
elements can be included in the profile to describe people’s
context–dependent privacy preferences.
b) Gesture Interaction: We define “Yes” and “No”
gestures. A “Yes” gesture is a victory sign, which means “I
would like to appear in the photo.” A “No” gesture is a palm,
which represents “I do not want to be photographed.” They are
consistent with people’s usual expectations, and is commonly
used in daily lives to express willingness or unwillingness to
be captured by others.
c) Privacy Protection Action: This action refers to
removal of identifiable information. In our implementation,
we blur user’s face as an example of protection action. Other
methods such as replacing the face with an average face,
blurring the whole body, or blending the body region into the
background can be integrated into our framework.
B. System Overview
Cardea is composed of the client app and cloud server. It
works based on data exchange and collaborative computing of
both the client and cloud sides. The major components and
interactions are shown in Figure 1.
Cardea Bystander application: Bystanders use Cardea ap-
plication to register as users and define their privacy profiles.
A bystander is presented with the user interface of Cardea
client application for registration. The application will extract
Fig. 2. Workflow of Cardea. Privacy protection decision is made according to
computing results from local recording device and remote cloud. Final privacy
protection action is performed on the original image.
face features from the bystander automatically, and then up-
load to the cloud to train the face recognition model. After
registration, a user can define his context–dependent privacy
profile. The profile will also be sent to the cloud and stored
in the cloud database for future retrieval. Both features and
profiles can be updated.
Cardea Recorder application: Recorders use Cardea appli-
cation to take images. After capturing an image, context ele-
ments will be computed locally on the device. Meanwhile, the
application detects faces and extracts face features. As hand
gesture recognition is extremely computationally–intensive,
the task will be offloaded to the cloud. To lower the risk of
privacy leakage during transmission, detected faces will be
removed from the image before sending the compressed image
data and face features to the cloud.
Upon receiving synthesized results from the cloud, the final
privacy protection action will be performed on the image
according to the computing results from both the local device
and remote cloud. Details of how to make privacy protection
decisions are discussed in Section IV.
Cardea Cloud Server: The function of the cloud server
is twofold: a) storing users’ profiles and training the user
recognition model; and b) responding to clients’ requests by
recognizing users in the image and perform corresponding
tasks.
When the cloud server receives requests from the client
application, it first recognizes users in the image using the
face recognition model. If there is any recognized user, the
corresponding privacy profile will be retrieved to trigger
related tasks. For example, if “Yes” or “No” gesture is enabled,
gesture recognition task will start. Finally, computing results
on the cloud will be synthesized and sent back to the client.
IV. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
The client application and cloud server are implemented
on Android smartphones and desktop computer respectively.
Next, we discuss the whole decision making procedures as
shown in Figure 2, which involves both the client application
and cloud server.
After an image is captured using Cardea, we first detect
faces and extract face features. If there is any face in the image,
we then input the extracted face features into the pre–trained
face recognition model to recognize users. If any Cardea user
is recognized, his privacy profile will be retrieved. Otherwise,
we do nothing to the original image.
The profile describes whether the user enables hand ges-
tures, and the location where he is concerned about his
visual privacy. The profile may also contain information about
selected scenes and other people that the user especially cares
about. Among these factors, “Yes” and “No” gestures have
the highest priority, that is, if any gesture is detected and
enabled in user’s profile, privacy protection action will be
determined instantly. In this way, users can temporarily modify
their privacy preferences for cases in which that they are aware
of being photographed, without updating their privacy profiles.
If gestures are not enabled or not detected for a user, and
the image is captured within the area/location user specifies,
we will start tasks of recognizing scene and finding if there
is anyone in the image that the user cares about according to
his privacy profile. When all the tasks are finished, the final
privacy protection decision will be made and performed on the
original image automatically to protect user’s visual privacy.
A. User Recognition
User recognition is to identify users that request visual
privacy protection in the image.
Face Detection: Face detection is to detect face regions in
the whole image. It is the first step for all face image process-
ing. We use Adaboost cascade classifier [17] implemented in
OpenCV [18] library to detect face regions, which has real–
time performance. We then filter detected face regions using
Dlib [19] to reduce false positives.
Face Feature Extraction: Face feature extraction is to find
a compact yet discriminative representation that can best de-
scribe a face instead of using raw pixels. Convolutional Neural
Networks (CNNs) have achieved state-of-the-art results on
many computer vision tasks, including face recognition, which
has been studied for years using different image processing
techniques [20], [21]. Compared with conventional features
such as Local Binary Patterns [22], features extracted from the
CNN models yield much better performance. Therefore, we
use 256–dimensional CNN–features extracted from a lightened
CNN model [23], which has a small size, fast speed of feature
extraction and low-dimensional representation. The model
is pre-trained with the CASIA-WebFace dataset containing
∼ 0.5M face images from 10575 subjects [24]. We use the
1KB output of the “eltwise fc1” layer from the CNN model
as face features. We have also experimented a deeper CNN
model with VGG architecture [25], which is widely used in
CNN models. However, the computational burden using VGG
model is too heavy compared with the lighted CNN model,
with no obvious performance improvement. We use the open
source deep learning framework Caffe [26] and its Android
library [27] to extract face features using the lightened CNN
model on Android smartphone,
Face Recognition: Face recognition is to identify users
in the image. We train the face recognition model using
TABLE I
TEN GENERAL SCENE GROUPS
Group name Scenes # Examples
Shopping 20 clothing store, market, supermarket
Travelling 9 airport, bus station, subway platform
Park & street 12 downtown, park, street, alley
Eating & 18 bar, bistro, cafeteria, coffee shop,
drinking fastfood restaurant, food court
Working & 9 classroom, conference center, library,
study office, reading room
Scantily clad 12 beach, swimming pool, water park
Medical care 2 hospital room, nursing home
Religion 11 cathedral, chapel, church, temple
Entertainment 5 amusement park, ballroom, discotheque
All 98
Support Vector Machine (SVM), which can achieve good
results without much training data. The model training is a
supervised learning process. The input training data for the
face recognition model are face features from Cardea users.
We train the SVM model using LibSVM [28] with linear
kernel, as the number of training samples from each user is
smaller than the dimensions of each input data.
With the face recognition model, we can get the prediction
result of the input face feature vector. The output is {pi}, i ∈
1, 2, . . . , n, where pi is the probability of being user i. We
set a probability threshold Tp, and only when maxi pi ≥ Tp
does it mean the user is recognized. This is to avoid the cases
when the input face feature from a non–registered bystander
is mistakenly recognized as a registered user. The threshold
Tp is chosen based on experiments that will be described in
the next section.
B. Context–aware Computing
Location, scene, and people in the image are three context
elements defined in users’ privacy profiles. We acquire these
context elements in different ways after the image is captured.
They decide the final privacy protection action to be performed
on the raw image.
Location Filtering: Location provides coarse control for
individuals. Users can name a concrete sensitive area in which
that they may have privacy worries. By specifying locations,
such as a campus, user’s privacy control will work in the area
of the campus. We directly obtain the location from the GPS
when the image is taken.
Scene Classification: Scene context is a complex concept
that not only relates to places, but also gives clues about what
people may be doing. We summarize 9 general scene groups.
In this way, people can select the general scene group, instead
of listing all places they care about. We fine–tune the pre–
trained CNN model to do the scene classification. The detailed
procedures are described below.
a) Data Preparing and Preprocessing: The data for
training scene classification is from Places2 dataset [29]. At
the time when Cardea is built, Places2 dataset contained 401
categories with more than 8 millions training images. Among
401 scene categories, we choose 98 categories, and then group
them into 9 general scene groups as listed in Table I based
on their contextual similarity. The grouped scenes are either
pervasive or common scenes in daily life that may have a
number of bystanders, or places where people are more likely
to have privacy concerns. This scene subset is composed of
1.9 million training images and 4900 validation images, 50
validation images for each category.
b) Training: The training procedure is a standard fine–
tuning process. We first extract features of all training images
from 98 categories. The features are the output of “fc7” layer
using the pre–trained AlexNet model provided by Places2
project as a feature extractor [29]. With all features, we then
train a Softmax classifier for 98 scene categories.
The category classifier achieves 55% validation accuracy on
98 categories. There is no other benchmark result on the subset
we choose, but recent benchmarks give 53% ∼ 56% validation
accuracy on the new Places2 dataset with 365 categories [29].
Both feature extraction and classifier training are implemented
using Caffe library [26], [30].
c) Prediction: To get the probability of each scene group,
we simply sum up the probabilities of categories in the same
group. The final prediction result is the group that has the
highest probability among 9 groups, which can be seen as a
hard–coded clustering process.
The prediction accuracy of our scene group model on the
validation set achieves 83%. As category prediction proba-
bilities are usually distributed among similar categories that
belong to the same group, the group prediction results are
superior to category prediction results. It is what we desire
for the purpose of privacy protection based on more general
scene context description.
Presence of Other People: The third context element we
take into account is people in the image. For example, user
Alice can upload 10 face features of Bob with whom Alice
does not want to be photographed. The task is to determine
whether Bob also appears in the image when Alice is captured
in the image.
A simple similarity matching is adopted as the number
of potential matches (i.e., people in the image except Alice
herself) to be considered is small. We apply cosine similarity
as distance metric to get the distance value between a pair
of feature vectors. Assume we have 10 of Bob’s face features
and 1 face feature extracted from a person P in the image.
We compare P’s feature with each of Bob’s features. If the
value does not exceed the distance threshold Td, we regard
it as a hit. When the hit ratio of Bob’s features reaches the
ratio threshold Tr, we believe P is Bob, therefore Alice should
be protected. Detailed face matching method is described in
Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Face Matching
1: initialize P’s feature f0, Bob’s feature fi, i ∈ 1, . . . , N , distance threshold Td,
hit ratio threshold Tr
2: m← 0 // number of hits
3: for i = 1 to N do
4: di ← dis(f0, fi) // dis(x, y) returns the distance between x and y
5: if di ≤ Td then
6: m← m+ 1
7: end if
8: end for
9: if m/N ≥ Tr then
10: return true // P is Bob
11: else
12: return false // P and Bob are two persons
13: end if
C. Interaction using Hand Gestures
Hand gestures are natural body languages. Our goal is to
detect and recognize “Yes” and “No” gestures in the image.
However, hand gesture recognition in images taken by regular
cameras with cluttered background is a difficult task. Conven-
tional skin color–based hand detectors will fail dramatically
in complex environments. In our design, we use the state–
of–the–art object detection framework Faster Region–based
CNN (Faster R-CNN) [31] to train a hand gesture detector
as described below.
Gesture Recognition Model Training: According to the
gesture recognition task, we categorize hand gestures into 3
classes: 1) “Yes” gesture; 2) “No” gesture; and 3) “Natu-
ral” gesture, which is a hand in any other pose. The date
used to train the gesture recognition model is composed of
13050 “Natural” gesture instances from 5628 images in VGG
hand dataset [32], [33], and 4712 “Yes” gesture instances,
3503 “No” gesture instances from 5900 images crawled from
Google and Flickr. Each annotation consists of an axis aligned
bounding rectangle, along with its gesture class.
With the comprehensive gesture dataset and VGG16 pre–
trained model provided by Faster–RCNN library, we fine–tune
the “conv3 1” and upper layers, together with region proposal
layers and Fast–RCNN detection layers [34]. The detailed
training procedures can be found in [35]. After the gesture
is detected, we link it to the nearest face, which requires users
to show their hands near their faces when using gestures.
We show the user interface of Cardea client application in
Figure 3(a), together with an example of image processing
results in Figure 3(b).
V. EVALUATION
In this section, we present evaluation results along 3 axes:
1) vision micro–benchmarks, to evaluate the performance of
different computer vision tasks, including face recognition and
matching, scene classification, and hand gesture recognition.
2) system overall performance, according to final privacy
protection decisions and users’ privacy preferences.
3) runtime and energy consumption, which shows the
processing time of each part, and energy consumed on one
image.
(a) Cardea client application user interface (b) Privacy protection example
Fig. 3. Cardea user interface and privacy protection results. In (a), jiayu registers as a Cardea user by extracting and uploading her 20 face features. She
specifies HKUST, four scene groups for privacy protection. She also enables “Yes” and “No” gestures. In (b), a picture is taken in HKUST. 3 registered users,
one “Yes” and one “No” gesture are recognized. The scene is correctly predicted as Park & street. Therefore, jiayu’s face is not blurred due to her “Yes”
gesture. Prediction probabilities are also shown in (b).
A. Accuracy of Face Recognition and Matching
We first select 50 subjects from LFW dataset [36] who has
more than 10 images as registered users. Note that subjects
in the CASIA WebFace Database used to train the lightened
CNN model do not overlap with those in LFW [37]. For each
subject, we extract at least 100 face features form Youtube
video to simulate the process of user registration. In total, we
get 5042 feature vectors. These features are then divided into
the training set and validation set. In addition, we collect user
test set and non–user test set to evaluate the face recognition
accuracy. The user test set is composed of 511 face feature
vectors from online images of all 50 registered users. The
non–user test set consists of 166 face feature vectors from
100 subjects in LFW database whose names start with “A” as
non–registered bystanders.
Figure 4(a) shows the recognition accuracy as to validation
set and user test set with different numbers of features per
person used for training. The accuracy refers to the fraction of
faces that are correctly recognized. The results show the model
trained with 10 ∼ 20 features per person can achieve near
100% accuracy on the validation set and over 90% accuracy
on the user test set. Little improvement can be achieved with
more training data. Therefore, we train the face recognition
model with 20 features per person. Figure 4(b) shows the
overall accuracy with probability threshold Tp. For non–user
test set, the accuracy means the fraction of faces that are
not recognized as registered users. As a result, the accuracy
will increase for the non–user test set but decrease for the
validation set and user test set when Tp goes up. To make
sure that registered users can be correctly recognized, and non-
registered users will not be mistakenly recognized, we choose
Tp to be 0.08 ∼ 0.09, which achieves over 80% recognition
accuracy for both users and non–users.
To evaluate face matching performance, we still use the
user test set. Subjects who have more than 20 features are
regarded as the database group, the rest are the query group.
Similar to face recognition accuracy, we break face matching
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Fig. 4. Face recognition accuracy.
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Fig. 5. Face matching accuracy with different distance threshold Td and
ratio threshold Tr .
accuracy into two parts: for persons belonging to the database
group, we need to correctly match features only to the correct
person; for persons not belonging to the database group,
we should not match features to anyone. Figure 5 shows
the matching accuracy with Cosine distance and Euclidean
distance respectively. The results show that Cosine distance
can achieve better performance with near 100% accuracy for
both situations in which people belong to the database or query
group. The preferable parameters would be distance threshold
Td ≈ 0.5, and ratio threshold Tr ≈ 0.5.
Overall, the face recognition and matching methods we em-
ploy with appropriate thresholds Tp, Td, and Tr can effectively
and efficiently recognize users and match faces in the images.
More importantly, only a small number of features are needed
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Fig. 6. Scene classification results.
for training the face recognition model and for face matching
algorithm.
B. Performance of Scene Classification
We recruited 8 volunteers and asked them to take pictures
“in the wild” belonging to 9 general scene groups. After
manually annotating these pictures, we had 759 images in
total, with 638 images in 9 scene groups we are interested in.
We then predict scene group for each image using the scene
classification model we trained.
The number of images and classification result of each
group are shown in Figure 6(a). The true positives (TP) refers
to images that are correctly classified, and false negatives (FN)
are those classified as other scene groups. Overall, we can
achieve 0.83 recall (TP/(TP+FN)), and 5 scene groups are
with recall more than 0.90. It is worth mention that the recall
of scene groups Scantily clad (Sc), Medical care (Me), and
Religion (Re) exceed 0.95, which provides strong support to
protect users’ privacy in sensitive scenes.
We also give the detailed classification confusion matrix in
Figure 6(b). It shows that most FN of Eating & drinking (Ea)
are classified as Shopping (Sh) or Working & study (Wo), and
most FN of Wo are classified as Ea or Sh. The reason is that
boundaries between Sh, Ea, or Wo are not clear. For example,
shopping malls have food courts, or people study in coffee
shop. The same reason accounts for the confusion between
Park & street (Pa) and Travelling (Tr). Moreover, for scene
categories such as pub and bar, people may group them into
Ea or En. Therefore, a safe way is to select more scene groups,
for instance, both Ea and En when you go to a pub at night.
In general, the evaluation results from images captured “in
TABLE II
CARDEA’S OVERALL PRIVACY PROTECTION PERFORMANCE.
Overall accuracy 86.4% Protection accuracy 80.4%
No protection accuracy 91.0%
Face recognition accuracy 98.5% “Yes” gesture recall 97.9%
scene classification recall 77.7% “No” gesture recall 77.3%
the wild” demonstrate that most of scenes can be correctly
classified, the performance is especially satisfactory for those
sensitive scenes.
C. Performance of Gesture Recognition
We asked our volunteers to take pictures for each other
with different distances, angles, lighting conditions, and back-
grounds. We manually annotated all images with hand regions
and the scene group it belongs to. In total, we got 338 hand
gesture images with 208 “Yes” gestures, 211 “No” gestures,
and 363 natural hands. The images covers 6 out of 9 scene
groups. For images do not belong to our summarized scene
groups, we categorize them into group Others.
Figure 7(a) and Figure 7(b) show the recall and precision
for “Yes” and “No” gestures under different scene groups. The
recall and precision of “Yes” gesture, the precision of “No”
gesture reach 1.0 for most of the scene groups, while the recall
of “No” gesture achieves 0.70 on average. For Entertainment
(En), the recall is low, resulting from dim illumination in
most of the images we tested. In general, the performance
of gesture recognition does not show any marked correlation
with different scene groups. Therefore, we further investigated
the recall in terms of gesture size, as low recall will greatly
threatens user’s privacy compared with precision.
Figure 7(c) plots the recall of gestures with varying hand
region sizes. Each image will be resized to about 800 × 600
square pixels, while keeping its aspect ratio. We classify them
into 10 size intervals as plotted along the x–axis. The result
shows “Yes” gestures can achieve more than 0.9 recall for all
sizes of hand region. On the other hand, recall of “No” gestures
tends to rise with increasing hand region size in general. It
indicates that the performance of “No” gesture recognition
can be improved with more training data with smaller sizes.
In summary, the performance of gesture recognition demon-
strates the feasibility of integrating gesture interaction in
Cardea for flexible privacy preference modification. It per-
forms extremely well for “Yes” gesture recognition, and there
is room for improvement of “No” gesture recognition with
more training samples.
D. Overall Performance of Cardea Privacy Protection
After evaluating each vision task separately, we now present
Cardea’s overall privacy protection performance. Faces in
the image taken using Cardea end up being protected (e.g.,
blurred) or remain unchanged, correctly or incorrectly, de-
pending on protection decisions made based on both user’s
privacy profile and results from vision tasks. Therefore, we
asked 5 volunteers to register as Cardea users and set their
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Fig. 7. Hand gesture recognition results.
privacy profiles. Now the face recognition model is trained
using 1100 face feature vectors from 55 people, including 50
people from LFW dataset. We take about 300 images and
get processed images. As we focus more on face recognition
rather than face detection, we only keep images that faces
have been successfully detected. In total we got 224 images
for evaluation.
Table III shows the final privacy protection accuracy, as
well as performance of each vision task. The protection accu-
racy shows 80.4% faces that require protection are actually
protected, and 91.0% faces that do not ask for protection
remain unchanged. Overall, 86.4% faces are processed cor-
rectly, though the scene classification recall and “No” gesture
recall do not reach 80%. The reason is that protection deci-
sion making process of Cardea sometimes can make up for
mistakes happening in the early step. For example, if user’s
“No” gesture is not detected, his face can still be protected
when the predict scene is selected in user’s profile.
In summary, Cardea achieves over 85% accuracy for users in
the real world. Improvements of each vision part will directly
benefit Cardea’s overall performance in the future.
E. Runtime and Energy Consumption
We validate the client side implementations on Samsung
Galaxy Note 44, with 4×2.7 GHz Krait 450 CPU, Qual-
comm Snapdragon 805 Chipset, 3GB RAM, and 16 MP, f/2.2
Camera. The server side is configured with Intel i7–5820K
CPU, 16GB RAM, GeForce 980Ti Graphic Card (6GB RAM).
The client and server communicate via a TCP over Wi–Fi
connection.
Figure 8 plots the time taken for Cardea to complete
different vision tasks. We take images with 1 face, 2 faces,
and 5 faces, in the size of 1920 × 1080. The images will be
compressed in JPEG format. On average, the data sent is about
950 KB. Note, some vision tasks will not be triggered in some
situations according to the decision workflow as explained in
Section IV. For example, if no user is recognized in the image,
all other tasks will not start. For the purpose of measurement,
we still activate all tasks to illustrate the runtime difference of
images captured with varying number of faces.
Among all vision tasks, face processing (i.e., face detection
and feature extraction) and scene classification are performed
4http://www.gsmarena.com/samsung galaxy note 4-6434.php
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on the smartphone. The face processing takes about 900
milliseconds for 1 face, and increases about 200 milliseconds
per additional face. Therefore, it reaches about 1100 and
1700 milliseconds for 2 faces and 5 faces respectively. This
is the most fundamental step that runs on the smartphone
locally due to privacy considerations. Owing to the real–time
OpenCV face detection implementation and lightened CNN
feature extraction model, it takes less then 1/3 overall runtime.
The scene classification takes around 900 milliseconds per
image, as it only performs once, independent of number of
people in the image. The face recognition and matching tasks
on the server side take less than 30 milliseconds for five
people. Though the time grows with increasing number of
people, compared with other tasks they barely affect the overall
runtime. The gesture recognition also runs on the server, and
it takes about 330 milliseconds. Similar to scene recognition,
it performs on the whole image once regardless the number
of faces. According to the measurement, we find the network
transmission accounts for a majority of the overall runtime
due to the unstable network environment.
In general, photographers using Cardea to take pictures
can get one processed image within 5 seconds in the most
heavy case (i.e., there is registered user who enables gestures,
and scene classification will be triggered on the smartphone).
Compared with existing image capture platforms that also
provide privacy protection such as I-pic [16], Cardea offers
more efficient image processing functionality.
Next, we measure the energy consumption of taking pictures
with Cardea on Galaxy Note 4 phone using the Monsoon
Power Monitor [38]. The images are also taken in size of
1920× 1080 square pixels. The first two columns of Table II
TABLE III
ENERGY CONSUMPTION OF CARDEA WITH DIFFERENT NUMBER OF FACES.
Face recognition Whole process (uAh) # of images
1 face 217.2 (std 3.4) 1134.5 (std 45.9) ∼ 2800
2 faces 344.1 (std 13.1) 1276.7 (std 113.8) ∼ 2500
5 faces 692.6 (std 36.5) 1641.1 (std 66.0) ∼ 2000
show the energy consumption for the face processing part
only, and for the whole process (i.e., from taking a picture to
getting the processed image) with 1 face, 2 faces, and 5 faces
respectively. The screen stays on during the whole process,
therefore a large portion of the energy consumption is due
to the always–on screen. Moreover, we can observe that face
processing energy is linear to face numbers. All the other parts
including scene classification, sending and receiving data are
independent of the number of faces in the image, which is
consistent with runtime measurements.
Using energy measurements, we also show Cardea’s capac-
ity on Galaxy Note 4 in the last column of Table II. This
device has a 3220 mAh battery, therefore can capture about
2000 high quality images with 5 faces using Cardea.
VI. RELATED WORK
Visual privacy protection has attracted extensive attentions
these years due to increasing popularity of mobile and wear-
able devices with built–in cameras. As a result, some research
works have proposed solutions to address these privacy issues.
Halderman et al. [14] propose an approach in which closed
devices can encrypt data together during recording utilizing
short range wireless communication to exchange public keys
and negotiate encryption key. Only by obtaining all of the
permissions from people who encrypt the recording can one
decrypts it. Juna et al. [39], [40] present methods that third–
party applications such as perceptual and augmented reality
applications have access to only higher-level objects such as
a skeleton or a face instead of raw sensor feeds. Raval et al.
[41] propose a system that gives users control to mark secure
regions that the camera have access to, therefore cameras are
prevented from capturing sensitive information. Unlike above
solutions, our work focuses on protecting bystanders’ privacy
by respecting their privacy preferences when they are captured
in photos.
To identify individuals who request privacy protection,
advanced techniques have been applied. PriSurv [42] is a
video surveillance system that identifies objects using RFID–
tags to protect the privacy of objects in the video surveillance
system. Courteous Glass [15] is a wearable camera integrated
with a far-infrared imager that turns off recording when new
persons or specific gestures are detected. However, these
approaches require extra facilities or sensors that are not
currently equipped on devices. Our approach takes advantage
of state–of–the–art computer vision techniques that are reliable
and effective.
Some other efforts rely on visual markers. Respectful Cam-
eras [10] is a video surveillance system that requires people
who wish to remain anonymous wear colored markers such
as hats or vests, and their faces will be blurred. Bo et al.
[8] use QR code as privacy tags to link an individual with
his photo sharing preferences, which empowers photo service
providers to exert privacy protection following users’ policy
expressions, to mitigate the public’s privacy concerns. Roesner
et al. [9] propose a general framework for controlling access to
sensor data on continuous sensing platforms, allowing objects
to explicitly specify access policies. For example, a person
can wear a QR code to communicate her privacy policy, and
a depth camera is used to find the person. Unfortunately,
using existing markers like QR code is technically feasibly,
but lacks usability, as few would wear QR code or other
conspicuous markers in public places. Moreover, static policies
cannot satisfy people’s privacy preferences all the time, which
is context–dependent, varying from each other and changing
from time to time. Therefore, we allow individuals to update
their privacy profiles at anytime, providing other cues to
inform cameras of necessary protection.
A recently interesting work I–pic [16] allows people to
broadcast their privacy preferences and appearance informa-
tion to nearby devices using BLE. This work can be incor-
porated into our framework. Furthermore, we specify context
elements that have not been considered before, such as scene
and presence of others. Besides, we provide a convenient
mechanism for people to temporarily change their privacy
preferences using hand gestures when facing the camera, while
broadcasted data in I-pic may not be received by people who
take images, or the received data is outdated.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we designed, implemented, and evaluated
Cardea, a visual privacy protection system that aims to address
individuals’ visual privacy issues caused by pervasive cam-
eras. Cardea leverages the state–of–the–art CNN models for
feature extraction, visual classification and recognition. With
Cardea, people can express their context–dependent privacy
preferences in terms of location, scenes, and presence of other
people in the image. Besides, people can show “Yes” and
“No” gestures to dynamically modify their privacy prefer-
ences. We demonstrated performances of different vision tasks
with pictures “in the wild”, and overall it can achieve about
86% accuracy on users’ requests. We also evaluated runtime
and energy consumed with Cardea prototype, which proves
the feasibility of running Cardea for taking pictures while
respecting bystanders’ privacy preferences.
Cardea can be enhanced in different aspects. The future
work includes improving scene classification and hand gesture
recognition performances, compressing CNN models to reduce
overall runtime, and integrating Cardea with camera subsystem
to enforce privacy protection measure. Moreover, protecting
people’s visual privacy in the video is another challenging and
significant task, which will make Cardea a complete visual
privacy protection framework.
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